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**ACTION**  
2766~~TOP SECRET/CODEWORD~~

March 29, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS

SUBJECT: Your Talk with Secretary General  
Aziz Ahmed

*Noted by HAK*

At Tab A is State's report of Ahmed's conversations in the Department last week. [redacted]

[redacted] It is quite balanced in reporting both a sympathetic hearing and genuine problems with military aid.

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Presumably you will either have worked out a brief meeting with the President or will be prepared to make the President's apologies.

Main Subjects for Discussion

1. Military aid. Ahmed's main concern seems to be to stimulate a positive response on resumption of military supply. His argument--which he presents persuasively--is that peace in South Asia requires that India realize that it cannot dictate the terms. This realization cannot come about if India sees Pakistan left to its own devices. He also weaves in the thought, gleaned from his visit to Moscow with Bhutto, that the USSR does not want war but will continue to build its position--faster if it sees that the US is not going to stand by Pakistan.

Suggested position: As the Secretary General has learned from his talks on the Hill, military supply is a painful issue, even for Pakistan's friends. You are very receptive to the argument that peace requires a strong Pakistan. Because of the difficulty, we will have to go through a difficult process here before any decision is reached. The Secretary General can assure President Bhutto that Pakistan's needs will be considered most sympathetically.

2. Prisoners of War. He may mention that Pakistan's UN mission is considering calling a Security Council meeting to dramatize India's failure to return its prisoners promptly as Section 118 of the Geneva Convention

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requires. We have taken the position that it is up to the Paks to decide whether this would improve prospects for negotiation. They have a case on the narrow issue, but the Indians would quickly expand it to get into the war crimes issue.

Suggested position: This is for the Pakistanis to decide. We will be glad to discuss the ramifications with them. (Regrettably we don't have much direct influence on this issue.)

3. Pak-India negotiations. He may describe Bhutto's willingness to negotiate peace with India short of giving permanence to the status quo ante in Kashmir. He will also describe Bhutto's readiness to negotiate with Mujib whom he hopes can help on prisoners.

Suggested position: US interests--as well as those of India and Pakistan--would be well served by a peace agreement. We do not at this stage have a great deal of influence in New Delhi. We are keenly interested, and are willing to do what we can.

4. Bangladesh recognition. You might want to tell Ahmed that we are asking our charge to inform President Bhutto of our plan to announce recognition of Bangladesh about April 4. We have delayed this long in deference to Bhutto's concerns and are going ahead in the knowledge that he has suggested our doing so.

5. Economic assistance. We are not aware of any major issues he may raise. Our plans include about \$50 million in PL 480 and financial support of the IBRD/IMF debt relief and standby program.

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